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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of game presentation dependent on ethnical aﬃliation.
Two games representing the same logical and strategical problem are introduced. Presented
games are continuous prisoner’s dilemma games where decision makers can choose an individ-
ual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions. In the ﬁrst condition, a positive
transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player. In the second condition, this
externality is negative. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects
from the West Bank and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying
these two conditions. Subjects in the West Bank show a substantially higher cooperation
level in the positive externality treatment. In Jerusalem no presentation eﬀect is observed.
Critically discussing our ﬁndings, we argue that a cross-cultural comparison leads to only
partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We
therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of diﬀerent presentations of
identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.
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Nowadays it is widely accepted - even by economists - that human behavior is not solely
driven by the ratio of the homo economicus, with it’s egocentric proﬁt maximization goal.
Experiments have shown that subjects’ behavior can be inﬂuenced among others by their
risk attitudes1, fairness, and equity preferences2, and even by the mere presentation of the
decision problem3.
A vast body of literature demonstrates that diﬀerently framed descriptions of decision
tasks can lead to divergent behavior4. In this broad ﬁeld, studies dealing with problems
creating either positive externalities (public good) or negative externalities (public bad)
are well established (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans, Schram & Offerman, 1998;
Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson, 2000; and Park, 2000). Results from
these publications in general suggest that experimental designs enabling positive external-
ities are aligned with signiﬁcantly higher cooperation levels compared to setups allowing
for negative externalities.
In this paper we intend to analyze ancestry as a factor leading to diﬀerent levels of coop-
eration dependent on presentations with positive and negative externalities. So far con-
ducted cross-cultural experimental studies apply only experiments with one presentation.
Possible, implicitly induced, presentation eﬀects are ignored (e.g., Anderson, Rodgers
& Rodriguez, 2000; Henrich, 2000; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr,
Gintis & McElreath, 2001; Buchan, Croson & Johnson, 2004a,b; Roth, Pras-
1E.g., Kahneman & Tversky (1979).
2E.g., Selten (1978), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), and Konow (2000).
3E.g., Pruitt (1967) and Selten & Berg (1970).
4Refer to Levin, Schneider & Gaeth (1998) and Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt (2006) for reviews on
framing types and framing literature.
1nikar, Okuno-Fujiwara & Zamir, 1991). To the best of our knowledge there exists
only one cross-cultural questionnaire study by Levin, Gaeth, Evangelista, Albaum,
and Schreiber (2001) that deals with country aﬃliation and goal framing eﬀects involving
American and Australian subjects. Therein, American subjects stated to reduce a signiﬁ-
cant higher amount of red meat if negative consequences of not reducing were stressed than
in a treatment in which the positive consequences of reducing were emphasized. Australian
subjects did not respond diﬀerently to the two frames.
In our study we conducted experiments in the West Bank and in Jerusalem (Israel) ap-
plying two games which represent diﬀerent presentations of the same decision task, one
presentation with a positive externality and one with a negative externality. The histor-
ical and political background of the participating subject pools makes them a promising
testbed for investigating ancestry induced behavioral diﬀerences. Knowing the impact of
diametral frames might be essential for the design of institutions built up to moderate
the relationship between the conﬂict parties. Formally identical bargaining and coopera-
tion setups might be perceived diﬀerently and might unconsciously lead to unintentional
consequences.
Our West Bank data show that the presentation signiﬁcantly inﬂuences decision makers’
choices. In the positive condition substantially more cooperation is manifested. Moreover,
in both games subjects do deviate remarkably from Nash and social optimum solutions.
The experiment conducted in Jerusalem yielded diﬀerent results. There, on an aggregate
level, no signiﬁcant presentation eﬀect can be detected. Nevertheless, data also show that
neither the Nash equilibrium nor the social optimal strategy is played.
2Comparing the level of cooperation under each condition across the two populations yields
opposite conclusions about cooperative behavior. While behavior in the game with positive
externality is more cooperative in the West Bank, behavior in the game with negative ex-
ternality is more cooperative in Jerusalem. In contrast to this a total evaluation of all data
gathered from each of the two populations shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in cooperation
levels.
Our results shed new light on the impact of presentation conditioned by preferences and
social norms in diﬀerent habitats. Therefore, we will argue that for deriving a conclusion
about a population’s cooperative behavior, diﬀerent presentations of logically identical
experimental setups should be considered and evaluated adequately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next part we will introduce
the two games. In the third section, we describe the method and procedure we applied
conducting the experimental study in the Westbank and in Jerusalem. In part four, we
present population-speciﬁc results. We compare data within and across populations. The
ﬁnal section ﬁve discusses our ﬁndings and their impact on cross-cultural research.
2 Experimental framework: Two games
The two applied games are both continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and public good (PG)
games in which subjects can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range
of possible actions5. Thus, in contrast to the classical PD game the question whether to
cooperate or to defect is not a binary choice. In the ﬁrst game (PDP) a player’s decision
5Refer to the Appendix for further details on the PD and PG nature of the two games.
3creates a positive externality to the matched player’s payoﬀ, while in the second game
(PDN) it represents a negative externality. We start with the description of the PDP game
and turn than to the PDN game.
2.1 Continuous prisoner’s dilemma with positive externality (PDP)
At the beginning of the game, two matched players i and j obtain an initial endowment
X = Xi = Xj. Each player then has the opportunity to transfer an integer part a of
X, nothing, or the entire amount X to the opposite player. Both players choose a ∈
[0,1,...,X−1,X] simultaneously. Each amount a, which is transferred to the paired player,
will be multiplied by factor k yielding to an eﬃciency gain by transferring a positive amount
a. Players’ payoﬀs consist of the initial endowment X minus the transferred amount a plus
the obtained and k-multiplied amount a transferred by the opposite player. Formally,
player i’s payoﬀ function is given by:
πPDP
i = Xi − aPDP
i + k · aPDP
j , with Xi = X,aPDP
i ∧ aPDP
j ∈ [0,X], and k > 1 (1)
The payoﬀ of the opposite player j is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is
a∗
i = a∗
j = 0. Player i anticipates player j’s choice aPDP
j = 0 and will therefore also choose
aPDP
i = 0. The collective optimal choice is ˆ ai = ˆ aj = X since it maximizes the joint payoﬀ
ΠPDP = πi + πj.
42.2 Continuous prisoner’s dilemma with negative externality (PDN)
The design of the PDN game is equivalent to the ﬁrst game, but instead of choosing
an amount a which is transferred to the opposite player, decision makers must choose an
integer which is transferred from the other player. Again two players i and j simultaneously
interact. Initially, both receive an endowment X = Xi = Xj. Each player then has the
opportunity to transfer a part a, nothing, or the entire amount X from the matched
player. Thus, again, both players simultaneously choose a ∈ [0,1,...,X − 1,X]. The
diﬀerence X −a, which is respectively not transferred, will be multiplied with k. Thus, by
transferring low amounts or nothing eﬃciency increases. In contrast to the PDP game, the
amount a, which is transferred is not multiplied. Players’ payoﬀs are determined by the
multiplied diﬀerence of their initial endowments X and the amount a taken by the opposite
player and the amount a which players take away from the counterpart. Formally, player
i0s payoﬀ function is given by:
πPDN
i = (Xi − aPDN
j ) · k + aPDN
i , with Xi = X,aPDN
i ∧ aPDN
j ∈ [0,X], and k > 1 (2)
Player j’s payoﬀ is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is a∗
i = Xj and
a∗
j = Xi. Player i anticipates player j’s choice aPDN
j = Xi and will therefore also choose
aPDN
i = Xj. The optimal collective choice is ˆ ai = ˆ aj = 0 since it maximizes the joint
payoﬀ ΠPDN = πi + πj.
52.3 Equivalence of the two games
In both games player i’s payoﬀ πi consists of two parts - a self-determined component πiA
and a part πiB resulting from player j’s actions. Therefore, the total payoﬀ of player i can
be stated as: πi = πiA + πiB. Player i’s self-determined payoﬀ fraction in the PDP game
is the amount XPDP
i − aPDP
i which is not given to the other player. In the PDN game
it is the amount aPDN
i that is taken away from the other player. The foreign determined
payoﬀ k · aPDP
j for player i in the PDP game is the amount which he receives from the
matched player. In the PDN game it is the amount k ·(XPDN
i −aPDN
j ) that the matched
player leaves to him. In addition, each possible strategy combination in one game can be
described by a strategy combination in the other game as well.
 iA = XPDP
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration for the equivalence of the two games
Figure 1 displays a graphical illustration of this equivalence. The initial endowment X
6for both players is the same in both games. Thus, XPDP
i and XPDN
j form an isosceles
triangle as shown in the upper right section of the ﬁgure. Player i chooses in the PDP-
game his self-determined payoﬀ XPDP
i − aPDP
i (thin line). In the PDN-treatment player
i can chose aPDN
i (thick line), which ensures him the same self-determined payoﬀ. If
player i does so, the left over XPDN
j − aPDN
i equals the amount aPDP
i transferred in the
PDP-treatment. These amounts are part of player j’s foreign-determined payoﬀ function
and are multiplied with k which is shown in the lower right section. The multiplier k is
described as a straight line. The lower left section of the graphic illustrates analogously
the self-determined payoﬀ of player j and the upper left section the foreign-determined
payoﬀ of player i. This illustrates that in each strategy space of the two games there exists
a strategy ai or a strategy-combination (ai;aj) that also exists in the corresponding game
in terms of cooperation, individual and, collective payoﬀ.
3 Experimental procedure
The experiments were conducted in May 2006. The West Bank sessions were run at the
AlQuds University located in the Westbank, close to the city of Jerusalem. Observations
from Jerusalem were gained at the RatioLab of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In
both universities students from diﬀerent departments participated6. Showing up for the
experiment each student received a ﬁxed payment of 25 NIS. At each university both games
6In Israel only subjects with very limited experimental experience were recruited (excluding previous
collaborations in trust game, prisoner’s dilemma, gift exchange, or public good game experiments) partic-
ipated. Palestinian subjects had no experimental experience. The median age of Israeli subjects was 25
years and 22 for Palestinian subjects. In Jerusalem nearly 40 percent of the participants were female, in
the West Bank nearly 30 percent. We checked with regression models for possible eﬀects of age and gender.
We could not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant inﬂuence, neither for each separate subject pool nor for the complete
sample of observations. Therefore, we will not go into more detail about this part of our analysis.
7were played as one-shoot games, applying the pen and paper method. We have chosen one-
shot games to avoid confounding framing eﬀects with strategical issues. Table 1 gives the
applied treatments:
Table 1: Treatment conditions
Game Location Independent observations
1 PDP West Bank 20
2 PDN West Bank 20
3 PDP Jerusalem 20
4 PDN Jerusalem 20
Experiments were run by local helpers comprehensively instructed and supported by the
authors, who stayed in the background. We are aware that this might result in an ex-
perimenter eﬀect. We decided to choose this procedure to avoid self-presentation and
face-saving eﬀects (Bond & Hwang, 1986) of unexperienced subjects resulting from the
presence of people from foreign countries. Since we are interested in the pure presentation
eﬀect this procedure seems to be justiﬁed.
Instructions were written in neutral language avoiding terms like ‘give’ and ‘take’. Ac-
cording to the location, the instructions were either in Hebrew or Arabic7. They diﬀered
between treatments only by the direction of the conducted transfer. Accordingly, transfers
were to be realized either to player j or from player j. This procedure ensured that only
the technical presentation and not the wording or further frames could inﬂuence subjects’
behavior.
7To avoid translation errors regarding the task and the cadence instructions were translated by natu-
ral speakers from German into the corresponding language and afterwards translated back into German
applying the back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). Instructions are available on request.
8Subjects were initially endowed with X = 10 Talers in the opening of every game8. The
multiplier k was ﬁxed with k = 2. The individual payoﬀ in the Nash equilibrium was 10
Talers, for each player. The Pareto optimum outcome generated 20 Talers, respectively. In
the run of the experiment participants received no feedback on matched player’s decisions.
After running the experiment two questionnaires were passed out. In the ﬁrst questionnaire
we asked participants for their ﬁrst-order beliefs on the behavior of the matched player9.
Correct beliefs were rewarded with addition of 1 Taler. The second questionnaire covered
socio-demographic questions. At the end of the session the outcome for each participant
was calculated, converted into NIS, and paid out.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of our study. First, we start with our ﬁndings
regarding the Palestinian subjects10. Afterwards we will present the Israeli data. Finally,
we will merge and compare results from both societies. Basis of our analysis is the degree
of cooperation exhibited by the participants. In the PDP game it is the transferred amount
(aPDP) and in the PDN game it is the amount left to the other player (10 − aPDN).
8Taler=Experimental Currency. During the experiment all transfers were made in Taler. The exchange
rate from Taler to NIS is 1 Taler = 2.5 NIS. We adjusted expected hourly payoﬀs to the average hourly
wage of a local student helper.
9We are aware of the fact that stated beliefs can be biased by prior decisions already undertaken.
However, since actual unbiased decisions are more valuable for our analysis, we agreed upon this procedure.
10At the moment, a Palestinian state does not exist. Most of our subjects are formally citizens of the
states of Israel and Jordan. Nevertheless, we will refer to them as Palestinians to ease the notation.
94.1 Palestinian Choices
Table 2 gives an overview on Palestinians’ aggregated transfers and beliefs in both condi-
tions:
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for Palestinian choices
Actions Beliefs
PDP PDN PDP PDN
Mean: 7.10 2.65 6.05 2.75
Median: 7 2 5 2
Mode: 5/10 2 5 0
SD: 2.36 2.08 2.89 2.34
On average, under the PDP-condition 7.10 Talers are transferred to the opposite player,
contrary to the PDN-treatment, where 2.65 Talers are left. The observed treatment eﬀect
is highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). Moreover, in the PDP-
treatment the quadratic distance to the social optimum (∆2 = 0.137) is signiﬁcantly smaller
than to the Nash equilibrium (∆2 = 0.557, p = 0.0019, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-
sided)11. In the PDN-treatment the opposite holds. Here, the quadratic distance to the
social optimum (∆2 = 0.582) is signiﬁcantly bigger than to the Nash equilibrium (∆2 =
0.112, p = 0.0007, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided). Our ﬁndings get additional
support evaluating median (7 vs. 2) and mode (5/10 vs. 2) values from both treatments.
Results for beliefs are in line with the behavior. There is more cooperation expected in
the PDP game (6.05 Talers) than in the PDN game (2.75 Talers). The observed treatment






2, with n being the number of
participants, ri ∈ (0,1) being the transfer rate of player i, and t ∈ (0,1) the predicted transfer rate. To
apply the quadratic distance concept we calculated relative transfers.
10eﬀect for beliefs is also highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.0008, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided).
Comparing actions and beliefs we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. This holds for
both treatments. According to this we conclude our ﬁrst result:
Result 1: The formal presentation of the game inﬂuences Palestinian subjects’ actions
and beliefs substantially. Cooperation (and its expectation) is signiﬁcantly and economically
higher under the PDP-condition than in the PDN-treatment.
4.2 Israeli Choices
Israelis’ aggregated actions and beliefs are presented in the following table 3:
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for Israeli choices
Actions Beliefs
PDP PDN PDP PDN
Mean: 4.40 4.55 3.40 3.40
Median: 4 5 4 4
Mode: 2 5 4/5 0
SD: 2.95 3.38 2.50 3.14
On average, under the PDP-condition 4.40 Talers are transferred to the opposite player.
Similarly, in the PDN-treatment 4.55 Talers are chosen not to be taken by the participants.
There is no statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence in behavior across the two treatments (p =
0.9455, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). Furthermore, we observe a weak tendency to play
according to the Nash equilibrium - the quadratic distance to the Nash equilibrium (PDP:
∆2 = 0.276; PDN: ∆2 = 0.316) is smaller in both treatments than the distance to the
social optimum (PDP: ∆2 = 0.396; PDN: ∆2 = 0.406). However, in both treatments the
11diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (PDP: p = 0.4039; PDN: p = 0.5295, both Wilcoxon signed
rank test, two-sided). The mean beliefs for both games are identical. On average, under
both conditions 3.40 Talers were expected to be contributed from the opposite player. No
statistical evidence for a diﬀerence can be found (p = 0.9671, Mann-Whitney-test, two-
sided). These ﬁndings get further support considering median values from both treatments.
Contrasting actions and beliefs we ﬁnd slightly higher amounts in actions compared to
stated beliefs (4.40 Talers vs. 3.40 Talers) for the PDP-treatment (p = 0.0467, Wilcoxon
signed rank test, two-sided). No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence is detected under the
PDN-condition. We summarize this as our second result:
Result 2: No evidence is found that the formal presentation of the game inﬂuences Israeli
subjects’ behavior or beliefs in a signiﬁcant way. Both conditions imply a similar level of
cooperation (and its expectation).
4.3 Comparison of presentation eﬀect-size
Results 1 and 2 show that the diﬀerence in cooperation levels among the two treatment
conditions is higher in the West Bank than in Jerusalem. We refer to this diﬀerence as the
eﬀect-size caused by the two diﬀerent presentations of the game. The average eﬀect-sizes12
for behavior and beliefs, are given in table 4.
While in Jerusalem the impact on displayed behavior and built beliefs between the two
games is nearly zero, actions (beliefs) in the West Bank are 44.5% (33%) more cooperative
12Recall, that all treatments are independent and therefore we could not calculate the eﬀect size as the
diﬀerence between the level of cooperation in the two games for one subject. To apply a statistical test on
the eﬀect size, we had to calculate all possible diﬀerences of cooperation levels a
PDP − (10 − a
PDN) for
one location. This leads to a sample size of 20 × 20 = 400 for each location.
12Table 4: Descriptive and statistical analysis of the eﬀect sizes
Descriptive Analyses of eﬀect size Testing eﬀect sizes in the West Bank against
Jerusalem with a Monte-Carlo approximation
of a two-sided permutation test.
Location Eﬀect behavior Eﬀect belief N=800 and 1000 repetitions
Mean SD Mean SD Eﬀect on p-value 95 % Conf. Int.
West Bank 4.45 3.0726 3.3 3.6288 Behavior 0.0000 0 − 0.0036
Jerusalem −0.15 4.3743 0 3.9139 Beliefs 0.0000 0 − 0.0036
in the PDP condition. Applying a Monte-Carlo approximation of a permutation test shows
that the eﬀect-sizes in Jerusalem and the West Bank are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p < 0.001
for transfers and p < 0.001 for beliefs, Permutation test, two-sided). This ﬁnding, together
with results 1 and 2, leads to our third result:
Result 3: Subjects in the West Bank are more sensitive to the game presentation than
subjects from Jerusalem. The diﬀerence between observed behavior and beliefs in the two
games is signiﬁcantly and economically higher in the West Bank than in Jerusalem.
4.4 Merging and crossing the data
We now want to compare our ﬁndings cross-culturally for each treatment condition in the
two locations. We will start with the transfer behavior in the West Bank and Jerusalem
in the PDP game. Afterwards we turn our attention to the PDN game. Figure 2 gives the
mean level of cooperation for observed behavior beliefs in the 2 treatments.
In the PDP condition, on average, Palestinian subjects have transferred 7.10 Talers to
their counterparts, while Israelis choose 4.40 Talers in this treatment-condition. Similarly,
on average subjects in the West Bank expect the matched player to transfer 6.05 Talers














Figure 2: Location speciﬁc mean cooperation levels in the 2 treatments
(see tables 2 and 3). Both diﬀerences are highly statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.005 and
p = 0.0058, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). Hence, we conclude our fourth result:
Result 4: In the West Bank cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher under the PDP-condition
than in Jerusalem. Moreover, under this condition stated beliefs are substantially and
signiﬁcantly higher in the West Bank than in Jerusalem.
In the PDN-treatment, on average, Israelis have left 4.55 Talers to their counterparts. Con-
trary, Palestinians choose to contribute only 2.65 Talers on average under this treatment
condition. Similarly, Israelis expect the matched player not to transfer 3.40 Talers com-
pared to 2.75 Talers which reﬂect Palestinian expectations towards their counterparts (see
table 2 and 3). The diﬀerence in actions is weakly signiﬁcant (p < 0.076, Mann-Whitney-
test, two-sided). Comparing stated beliefs delivers no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Thus, our ﬁfth
result states:
14Result 5: Israelis cooperate more under the PDN-condition than Palestinians do. Fur-
thermore, under this condition the mean belief on cooperation by Israelis is higher than the
expectations quoted by Palestinians.
Taken together, results 4 and 5 directly lead us to a further stunning result:
Result 6: Statistically robust results from diﬀerent locations gathered under one presen-
tation condition do not necessarily hold for other presentations of the same decision task
applied in the same locations.
Our results clearly show that depending on the presentation form we observe divergent
levels of cooperation in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
In a next and ﬁnal step we try to elicit whether cooperation in general is higher in one
of the two subject pools involved. Hence we investigate all 80 independent observations
(from PDP- and PDN-condition) gathered in the two societies. Table 5 gives an overview
on actions and beliefs from both samples:
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and quadratic distances for
aggregated data from the West Bank and Jerusalem
West Bank Jerusalem
Actions Beliefs Actions Beliefs
Mean: 4.88 4.40 4.48 3.40
Median: 5 5 5 4
Mode: 5 5 5 0
SD: 3.15 3.09 3.13 2.80
∆
2Nash: 0.334 0.287 0.296 0.192
∆
2Pareto: 0.359 0.407 0.400 0.512
15On average, Palestinians contribute 4.88 Talers when both treatments are considered. Sim-
ilarly, Israelis add 4.48 Talers. There is no evidence for a statistical diﬀerence among the
involved subject-pools (p = 0.547, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). The same can be stated
for merged beliefs. Here, Palestinians on average expect to receive 4.40 Talers, and Israelis
expect 3.40 Talers from their counterpart. Again, no statistical diﬀerence can be detected
across both subject-pools (p = 0.1938, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). Moreover, we
observe no substantial diﬀerence among the quadratic distances to the Nash-equilibrium
(∆2 = 0.334 and ∆2 = 0.296, p = 0.5470, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided) and to the
Pareto optimum (∆2 = 0.359 and ∆2 = 0.400, p = 0.5470, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided)
of transfer amounts from both societies. Our results considering actions are supported by
evaluating median (5 vs. 5) and mode (5 vs. 5) values from both treatments and samples.
Equally, for stated beliefs we ﬁnd that median (5 vs. 4) values do not substantially diﬀer13.
Thus, our seventh and last result is:
Result 7: In the aggregated data from both treatments no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
levels of cooperation (and its expectation) in the West bank and Jerusalem can be found.
5 Summary and Discussion
The aim of this work was to investigate the impact of game presentations dependent on
ancestry. Merging the experimental application of two logically and strategically identical
decision problems with cross-cultural research methods we demonstrated that data ob-
13Mode values also support this ﬁnding. There, 5 is the amount chosen the second highest time by
participants. This amount was chosen in 9 from 40 cases, contrary to the actual mode=0 which was chosen
10 times out of 40.
16tained from only one presentation might lead to only partly valid results and conclusions
on population-speciﬁc behavior. This ﬁnding holds especially true if results are compared
and evaluated across ethnical borders.
Our results from the West Bank have shown that the formal presentation of a decision
problem can inﬂuence subjects’ choices and beliefs substantially. The cooperation level
and associated beliefs are signiﬁcantly higher when subjects can create positive externalities
towards each other compared to a situation where resulting externalities are negative. In
the positive condition subjects in the West Bank are more willing to transfer higher amounts
to voluntarily increase the mutual welfare. On average, this attitude is also expected from
the opposite player. Contrary, in the second condition subjects leave relatively less to the
counterpart. In this interaction more negative beliefs about the opponents’ behavior are
formed. These ﬁndings give support to prior work by Andreoni (1995), Sonnemans et
al. (1998), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), and Park (2000).
The behavior of our Palestinian subjects is analogous with results from goal framing exper-
iments (e.g. Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). In
these experiments the negative formulation of an identical problem has an higher impact
on subjects behavior than a positive one. These authors argue that this attitude could
be connected to the concept of loss aversion as introduced by Kahneman & Tversky
(1979). It is possible that Palestinians perceive an amount taken away from them as a
loss, while they perceive an amount voluntarily given away not or less as a loss. To avoid
this loss, players take more from the matched player and thus cooperation is on a lower
level in the PDN game compared to the PDP game. Therefore, Palestinians’ behavior in
17our experiment might be explained by Kahneman and Tversky’s loss aversion. This might
deliver an explanation why Palestinians seem to obtain a higher beneﬁt from doing a good
rather than from not doing a bad deed.
Another possible explanation for this consistent behavioral pattern might be that, even if
the technical presentation of the implemented game designs was strictly neutral, Palestinian
participants perceive situations with potential negative externalities as more competitive
than situations with potential positive externalities. As a consequence of this cognition,
they might react much more sensitive to the threat of a possible loss induced by the right
of the second player to take away any amount as compared to the situation where they can
determine themselves which amount to give away.
Future studies have to analyze whether Palestinians’ behavior is similar to Western sub-
jects’ behavior as the cited public good game results suggest or whether they are speciﬁcally
rooted in Arabic culture.
Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter (2007) give evidence for the latter conjecture. They
have found that Arabian participants are not - unlike most decision makers from Western
populations who cooperate more under a punishment condition - sensitive to the threat and
enforcement of punishment in public good game setups. As a consequence, Palestinians’
choices in our framework appear to be similar to ﬁndings in Western societies. However,
the driving motives behind could diﬀer.
Although geographically not far away located from the West Bank, experiments run in
Jerusalem yielded diﬀerent results. There, aggregated subjects’ actions and beliefs appear
to be unaﬀected across treatments in terms of the measured outcome. No signiﬁcant
18presentation eﬀect can be veriﬁed. Israelis seem to show a similar behavioral attitude
in both treatments. Further studies must investigate the cause for this similar behavior
displayed under diﬀerent conditions. In fact, actual transfer amounts are diﬀerent across
treatments but the resulting cooperation levels are not. Do Israelis actually perceive the two
games as presentations of the same decision problem, or do they apply diﬀerent approaches
leading to similar behavioral consequences and outcome?
The substantial diﬀerence between Palestinian and Israeli subjects in the positive condi-
tion and the similar results under both conditions in Israel might be rooted in the structure
of the Israeli society. The Israeli society is ethnically heterogeneous and consists of dif-
ferent subcultures. The gaps between these ethnic groups do not decrease. In fact, the
segregation of the society increases further, especially since the breakdown of the Soviet
Union14. As Knack and Kefer (1999) point out cooperation on the national level of
societies is negatively inﬂuenced by the degree of ethnic diﬀerences within these societies.
Trust and cooperative norms are strong within ethnic groups but weak among diﬀerent
groups. Subjects in heterogeneous societies might be less inﬂuenced by the presentation of
a problem since they already apply a certain pattern of thought on an decision problem.
As Levin et al. (2001), we observe that subjects in some regions might respond to framing
eﬀects, while others do not. In addition to this we have shown that this might confront
results from cross-cultural research with new challenges: Comparing levels of cooperation
under each of the conditions across subject pools might lead to opposite conclusions on
society-speciﬁc behavioral attitudes. Palestinians display a relatively higher cooperation
level and more positive beliefs on opponent player’s contributions than Israelis when only
14Compare Fershtman & Gneezy (2001), Cohen & Haberfeld (1998), and Mark (1994).
19the positive externalities condition is considered. Contrary, Israelis cooperate relatively
more and state substantially higher beliefs when only the negative externalities condi-
tion is taken into account. However, when all available data gathered from each of the
two populations are evaluated, we ﬁnd no evidence that relative cooperation levels and
stated beliefs are diﬀerent. These striking results would not have been detected by the
implementation of mere one-sided experimental designs. Taking ﬁndings from diﬀerent
presentations into account might not only enrich standard socio-economic theory but also
reﬁne our experimental methodology. Moreover, recognizing the impact of the presented
frame might be essential for the design of international institutions where foreign actors
repeatedly interact for the ﬁrst time in rapidly changing environments. Bargaining and
cooperation setups might be perceived diﬀerently by decision makers depending on their
ethnical background. The culture-sensitive adaptation of constituting conditions is neces-
sary for increasing mutual beneﬁts from cooperation within such institutions.
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23Appendix
External analogy with the classical PD and PG games
To show external analogy of our continuous games with a classical binary-choice PD we write down the 2×2-











C1 k · X,k · X 0,X + k · X
D1 X + k · X,0 X,X
Table 2: 2 × 2-matrix, representing the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The PD condition (1 + k) · X > k · X > X > 0 is satisﬁed for all k > 1 for both games. In our experiment
this condition is fulﬁlled, with k = 2. Given these parameters, by linear interpolation payoﬀs from the
discrete payoﬀ matrix can be obtained
15. Having a freely pre-determined range of possible actions a allows
to obtain a non-binary measure of cooperation.
We now show external analogy of both games with a typical PG-design. The payoﬀ function of a
common 2-person PG is given by:
π
PG
i = Xi − ai + k ·
ai + aj
2
, with i 6= j, and k > 1
Xi represents player i’s initial endowment. The parameter ai is the investment into the public good.
Accordingly, Xi − ai represents the investment into the private good. All investments made to the public
good are multiplied by the factor k. The fraction of one half of the increased public pie is returned to
both players i and j by the addition to their investments into the private good. For k < 1 it is rational
for both players to invest nothing into the public good since the public pie shrinks. In the case of k > 1
both players can increase their personal income by investing into the public good. However, in this case
15See also Verhoeﬀ (1998).
24each player has a strong incentive to free-ride hoping to reach even higher returns caused by a positive
investment of the second player. From the initial PG-equation we get:
πi = Xi − (1 −
k
2
) · ai + k ·
aj
2
⇐⇒ πi = Xi − θ · ai + k






2 · (1 −
k
2)
The payoﬀ-function of the PDP-game was given in equation by:
π
PDP
i = Xi − a
PDP
i + k · a
PDP
j
It is evident that both games are of the same type: A PG-game with parameter k
∗ is formally similar to
the PDP-game with parameter k. Because of internal equivalence among PDP and PDN it is obvious that
the PDN-game is a PG too. Contrary to the PG-game, in PDP and PDN there is no back ﬂow of own
investments. Thus, each ai > 0 is transferred directly to the opposite player thereby providing a lower
individual incentive to cooperate.
25Instructions for the experiment (for PDP and PDN)
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very carefully. It is very
important that you do not talk to other participants for the time of the entire experiment. In case you do
not understand some parts of the experiment, please read through these instructions again. If you have
further questions after this, please give us a sign by raising your hand out of your cubicle. We will then
approach you in order to answer your questions personally.
To guarantee your anonymity you will draw a personal code before the experiment starts. Please write
this code on top of every sheet you use during this experiment. You will later receive your payment from
this experiment by showing your personal code. This method ensures that we are not able to link your
answers and decisions to you personally.
During this experiment you can earn money. The currency within the experiment is ‘Taler’. The
exchange rate from Taler to NIS is:
1 Taler = 2.5 NIS
Your personal income from the experiment depends on both your own decisions and on the decisions
of other participants. Your personal income will be paid to you in cash as soon as the experiment is over.
During the course of the experiment, you will interact with a randomly assigned other participant.
The assigned participant makes his/her decisions at the same point in time as you do. You will get no
information on who this person actually is, neither during the experiment, nor at some point after the
experiment. Similarly, the other participant will not be given any information about your identity. You
will receive information about the assigned participant’s decision after the entire experiment has ended.
After the experiment, please complete a short questionnaire, which we need for the statistical analysis
of the experimental data.
26Description of the experiment (PDP)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act as Person A, and the
randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You and Person B must simultaneously make a
similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B ﬁrst receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of your endowment to Person B. You can only transfer
integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The amount you transfer to Person B is doubled. That means that Person B receives twice the amount
you have transferred to him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as Person B is given exactly the same alternatives as you have.
He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to you. The amount Person B transfers to you is
also doubled. That means that you receive twice the amount Person B has transferred to you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment neither person receives
any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
Initial endowment
- amount you choose to transfer to Person B
+ twice the amount b Person B transferred to you
= your personal income
27Description of the experiment (PDN)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act as Person A, and the
randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You and Person B must simultaneously make a
similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B ﬁrst receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of Person B’s endowment to yourself. You can only
transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The remaining amount - that is the amount that you do not transfer from Person B’s endowment to yourself
- is doubled. This means that Person B receives twice the amount that you do not transfer from
him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as person B is given exactly the same alternatives as you have.
He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to himself/herself. The remaining amount that
he/she does not transfer from your endowment to himself/herself is doubled. This means that you receive
twice the amount that he/she does not transfer from you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment, neither person
receives any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
+ amount you choose to transfer from Person B to yourself
+ twice the amount Person B did not transfer from your endowment
to himself/herself
= your personal income
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